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Abstract Driven by privacy-related fears, users of Online Social Networks may
start to reduce their network activities. This trend can have a negative impact on
network sustainability and its business value. Nevertheless, very little is understood
about the privacy-related concerns of users and the impact of those concerns on
identity performance. To close this gap, we take a systematic view of user privacy
concerns on such platforms. Based on insights from focus groups and an empirical
study with 210 subjects, we find that (i) Organizational Threats and (ii) Social
Threats stemming from the user environment constitute two underlying dimensions
of the construct “Privacy Concerns in Online Social Networks”. Using a Structural
Equation Model, we examine the impact of the identified dimensions of concern on
the Amount, Honesty, and Conscious Control of individual self-disclosure on these
sites. We find that users tend to reduce the Amount of information disclosed as a
response to their concerns regarding Organizational Threats. Additionally, users
become more conscious about the information they reveal as a result of Social
Threats. Network providers may want to develop specific mechanisms to alleviate
identified user concerns and thereby ensure network sustainability.
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Abbreviations
AVE Average Variance Extracted
CFA Confirmatory Factor Analysis
EFA Exploratory Factor Analysis
FGQ Focus Group Quotation
HR Human Resources
MM Measurement Model
OSN Online Social Network
PCOSN “User Privacy Concerns on OSNs” construct
SD Standard Deviation
SEM Structural Equation Model
SM Structural Model
Introduction
Online Social Networks (OSNs) such as Facebook or StudiVZ have evolved into
popular Web places where users communicate and share updates with friends. This
facilitated exchange of information helps create social capital by bringing
individuals closer together and maintaining existing relationships (Ellison et al.
2007). However, media-driven user privacy concerns might damage the self-
sustainability of OSNs and ultimately ruin their public value. Motivated by these
developments, this study identifies user privacy concerns specific to OSNs and
explores their impact on self-disclosure dynamics.
Indeed, participation in OSNs is closely related to information disclosure, an
integral part of the identity construction process on these sites. Building on the
individual’s desire to engage in impression management, OSN platforms induce
users to report on their experiences, share news, and upload photos in their
public space. For example, “more than 1 billion pieces of content” including
links, news updates, photos, etc. are weekly shared on the Facebook platform
(Facebook 2009). User-provided content is also an important determinant of the
OSN commercial success (Krasnova et al. 2008). In fact, to remain sustainable,
OSN providers must support user communication as without supply of fresh
material, users may lose interest and refrain from coming back (Boyd and Heer
2006). On the other hand, mutual updates motivate users to return and stay
active.
While users want to communicate and present themselves to others, many are
becoming increasingly vigilant with regard to the information they disclose. A
chain of privacy-related public scandals, along with related media coverage
revealing questionable information handling practices, has started to increase user
awareness with respect to the privacy threats users face (Wieschowski 2007). For
example, the introduction of the Beacon application, which displays recent
purchases, and the News Feed feature, which makes user actions public (Boyd
2008), have made more users aware of the scope and reach of the information they
publish. As a consequence, OSN groups such as “Petition: Facebook, stop
invading my privacy” or “Facebook Privacy Awareness Syndicate” emerged. Such
developments can undermine the self-sustainability of the OSN platforms in the
long term.
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However, despite the importance of these developments for the OSNs’ business
and public value, researchers know little about the privacy concerns of users and
how those concerns impact users’ self-presentation and self-disclosure strategies.
Even though Acquisti and Gross (2006), Dwyer et al. (2007), Krasnova et al.
(2009), Tufekci (2008), Stutzman (2006) have made the first steps to determine the
impact of privacy concerns on behaviour, the findings remain limited and are often
of controversial nature. What privacy threats concern users the most? How do
privacy concerns impact individual self-communication? What can OSN providers
do to minimize these concerns, ensure their long-term sustainability and maintain
healthy impression management levels? These questions must be answered to ensure
that the public value of OSNs—their ability to create social capital—is retained.
Looking for answers to these questions, we take a systematic view of the user
privacy concerns on OSNs and explore their impact on self-disclosure variables.
This paper is structured as follows: In the “Identity Construction and Privacy
Concerns” section, we provide a detailed review of relevant studies. We show that
state of the art literature does not have a precise answer on how user privacy
concerns impact OSN participation. This may be partly due to a lack of validated
measurement instruments addressing OSN specifics. To close this gap, in the next
section, “Stage 1: Understanding User Privacy Concerns,” we analyze the results of
two focus groups we conducted to capture relevant dimensions of individual privacy
concerns particular to OSN platforms. Identified dimensions were operationalized
and validated in a survey with 210 subjects described in the section “Stage 2:
Validating ‘User Privacy Concerns on OSNs’ Construct”. We find that (i)
Organizational Threats and (ii) Social Threats stemming from the user environment
constitute two underlying dimensions of the construct “Privacy Concerns in Online
Social Networks”. Building on these insights, in the section “Stage 3: Identity
Construction and Privacy Concerns,” we examine the impact of these two types of
privacy concerns on three dimensions of self-disclosure: Amount, Honesty, and
Conscious Control. Our findings reveal interesting dynamics in the self-disclosure
behaviour of users. Additionally, we provide insights relevant for the OSN provider,
who can then develop specific mechanisms to alleviate identified user concerns and
thereby ensure network sustainability.
Identity construction and privacy concerns
Boyd and Ellison (2007) describe OSNs as online environments in which people
create public or semi-public self-descriptive profiles and make links to other people.
Public self-presentation is a central part of OSN participation. The abundance of
impression management activities (Goffman 1959) on OSNs is related to the
asynchronous nature of communication on these platforms (Walther 1996).
Furthermore, due to their emphasis on the verbal and linguistic cues, OSNs enable
individuals with significant control over the impression they produce on others—an
important advantage over face-to-face communication where nonverbal communi-
cation cues play a critical role (Ellison et al. 2006). These capabilities allow users not
only to express their identity more fully, but also to express their latent and nested
identities (Schau and Gilly 2003). In their profiles, users can report on their
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experiences and achievements, upload photos, and display their list of connections,
thereby projecting desirable associations and impressions. Apart from their profile,
OSN participants are given opportunities to construct their identity by using
applications, participating in discussions, blogging, or posting comments in public
areas.
The content of self-presentation can be broadly referred to as self-disclosure
(Schau and Gilly 2003). The information disclosure strategies an individual uses on
the platform depend on that individual’s particular goals (Gibbs et al. 2006). For
example, those looking for new relationships might strategically disclose information
to facilitate search for others, help to find the common ground and transmit desired
signals (Lampe et al. 2007). Overall, OSNs allow users to pre-select what
information they publish, giving them the opportunity to construct a public identity
that may be closer to their “ideal self” (Higgins 1987). Boyd (2007) notes that user
behaviour on OSNs is to a large extent determined by the desire to self-present, as
OSNs allow users to unfold the most salient facets of their identity in front of
significant others. Nevertheless, most users maintain a tightly integrated social
network that consists primarily of real-life friends. This, combined with the non-
anonymous nature of the platform, invisibly controls users’ statements and thereby
prevents them from engaging in exaggerated self-enhancement and misrepresenta-
tion—a phenomenon often observed in anonymous online forums, dating platforms,
and chats (e.g. Brym and Lenton 2001). In this sense, identity created in OSNs is an
idealized projection of the real-life “actual self”.
However, rising privacy concerns have begun to compel users to reconsider their
approach to self-communication on social networking sites. Boyd and Ellison (2007)
argue that perceived privacy threats are changing the way users disclose
information about themselves by undermining their ability to control and manage
impressions and social contexts. This dynamics may have drastic negative
consequences for the sustainability of OSNs. Unable to construct their identity in
the desired way, users may in the end reduce their participation level or even leave
the network—a scenario in which both commercial and public value of the OSN
platforms gets destroyed.
Current research findings provide controversial insights into how privacy
concerns shape user behavior on OSNs. Whereas several studies find support for a
dichotomy between stated privacy concerns and actual revelation behavior (e.g.
Acquisti and Gross 2006; Stutzman 2006; Tufekci 2008), Krasnova et al. (2009)
show that users do reduce the amount of information they disclose in response to
their privacy concerns. Due to transferability of the privacy risks to the offline world,
Lusoli and Miltgen (2009) argue that young users may even abstain from using the
appropriate electronic identity services to which OSNs belong.
Existing disagreement between research findings can also be partly due to the
lack of validated measurement instruments addressing the unique character of OSNs.
This deficiency is particularly evident for privacy concern scales. Overall, privacy
concern is typically viewed and measured as a multidimensional construct (e.g.
Malhotra et al. 2004; Smith et al. 1996). In the organizational context, Smith et al.
(1996) have developed a “Concern For Information Privacy” (CFIP) Framework in
which they differentiate between collection, secondary use, improper access, and
errors concerns in the organizational context. Building on the CFIP, Malhotra et al.
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(2004) have pointed out collection, control, and awareness of the privacy practices
as dimensions of the Internet Users’ Information Privacy Concerns (IUIPC).
Both CFIP and IUIPC have been widely applied in various settings. However,
when exploring the social networking context, we notice that scholars tend to view
concern for privacy in a distinctive manner. For example, apart from asking general
questions related to accessibility and secondary use of information, Acquisti and
Gross (2006) test a specific set of situations implying possible outcomes of profile
accessibility, such as, for example, stalking. Furthermore, Gürses et al. (2008)
distinguish between four categories of OSN-specific privacy breaches encompassing
issues of indeterminate visibility of user profile information, separation of identities
and aggregation as well as misappropriation and contested ownership of user data.
Finally, Tufekci (2008) argues that the main source of privacy risks on OSNs lies in
the inability of users to control the audience both spatially and temporally.
Hence, in addition to the common online privacy concerns typical for the E-
commerce context arising as part of the interaction between a user and an OSN
provider, OSN members are subject to the specific privacy-related risks rooted in the
public and social nature of OSNs. For this reason, we argue that existing measures
(e.g. Malhotra et al. 2004; Smith et al. 1996) are not sufficient to capture all relevant
dimensions of user concerns in the OSN context.
Hogben (2007) has taken the first step to address this deficit by developing a
broad overview of privacy threats specific to OSNs; these include digital dossier
aggregation by third parties, online stalking, bullying, reputation slander, just to
name a few. Furthermore, a recent report of the Internet Safety Technical Task Force
(2008) elaborates on the privacy threats young people face on social networking
platforms, which include online harassment and cyberbullying, sexual solicitation
and exposure to problematic content. However, despite the encompassing nature of
these studies as well as their contribution to the field, a user perspective on these
and other privacy threats—user privacy concerns—has still received limited
attention.
Summarizing, we find that only a limited number of studies examine the impact
of user privacy concerns on the dynamics of self-presentation and self-disclosure.
Discovered controversies between the obtained results from these studies may be
partly due to the lack of valid instruments, which measure privacy concerns in the
distinctive OSN context. We fill this gap by developing a taxonomy for users’
privacy-related concerns and by examining their impact on various self-disclosure
strategies.
Research approach
As shown in Fig. 1, the study involved three stages. Due to the lack of validated
measurement instruments for capturing privacy concerns of OSN users, we first
focused our effort on developing, operationalizing, and validating the construct
“User Privacy Concerns on OSNs” (PCOSN) in the first two parts of our study. In
the third part, we examined how identified concern dimensions influence various
aspects of individual self-disclosure. As a whole, the study provides relevant insights
into the dynamics of identity construction in the light of privacy concerns.
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STAGE 1: Understanding user privacy concerns
Since few past studies have dealt with OSN-specific privacy concerns, two focus groups
comprised of OSN users—all students—were assembled at the Institute of Information
Systems in Berlin, Germany. A focus group is a popular method of exploratory research
used to gain an understanding of consumer impressions, structure information, and
generate empirically testable hypotheses (Churchill and Iacobucci 2002).
Both focus groups revolved around the same set of questions dealing with factors—
motivators and impediments—behind OSN participation. In this paper, however, we
concentrate mainly on user privacy concerns as a major impediment of OSN
participation. With the help of the focus groups we aimed to identify which threats
users are concerned about and how they affect the process of identity construction. We
did not prompt participants about any specific threats which OSNs might involve, but
rather asked open questions such as: “Do you feel safe when giving out your
information on a social network? Why yes, Why not?”.
As a result of privacy-related content analysis of the focus group transcripts, four
main categories involving twelve sub-categories of privacy concerns were tentatively
identified and grouped into a codebook: General Accessibility Concerns, Concerns
about Social Threats, Organizational Threats, and Identity Theft. It is important to
• Two focus groups were conducted to understand privacy concerns of  
OSN users. 
• Based on the content analysis of the focus group transcripts, four main  
categories of privacy concerns were identified: General Accessibility 
Concerns, Concerns about Social Threats, Organizational Threats, and 
Identity Theft. 
STAGE 1: EXPLORATORY PART
• A survey was developed that captured the concern categories identified in  
Stage 1 as well as three self-disclosure strategies. 
• 210 usable responses were collected. 
• Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis was used to analyze the 
underlying data structure. 
• Two overarching dimensions - Concerns about Organizational and  
Concerns about Social Threats - were identified and summarized into a  
“Privacy Concerns on OSNs” (PCOSN) construct. 
STAGE 2: CONFIRMATORY PART 
• The impact of PCOSN on three dimensions of Self-Disclosure – Amount, 
Honesty, and Conscious Control – were explored in a Structural Equation  
Model. 
STAGE 3: IMPACT OF PRIVACY CONCERNS ON SELF-
DISCLOSURE  
Fig. 1 Research framework
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note that whereas a tentative structure for our codebook involved some concern
categories prompted by Hogben (2007) as well as Smith et al. (1996), most themes
(categories and sub-categories) were deduced from the focus groups transcripts in
the process of their analysis, as suggested by Ryan and Bernard (2000).
At the next step, two coders independently assigned 96 extracted keywords to the
pre-defined codebook sub-categories. A resulting inter-coder reliability constituted 0.756
(p<0.000), which shows an acceptable level of agreement between the coders (Landis
and Koch 1977). Table 1 provides a summary of the coding procedure: From the
column “Agreement between both coders,” one can infer for how many keywords both
coders agreed that a keyword belonged to the same particular sub-category (76
keywords it total). The “Relative Importance” column provides the weight of a particular
category, which can be interpreted as the relevance of a particular group of concerns.
General Accessibility was the most frequently mentioned concern. It refers to
fears connected to unwanted access of the information provided on an OSN.
Specifically, due to the public nature of these platforms, the information users
provide can be potentially viewed by other parties for whom this information was
not initially intended: fellow students, supervisors, subordinates, parents, just to
name a few (Hewitt and Forte 2006). For example, in a longitudinal study, Lampe et
al. (2008) show that an increasing number of users believe that future employers
accessed their profile. At the same time less and less users perceive Facebook purely
as a student space.
Focus group respondents differentiated between various dimensions of the
General Accessibility concern. Accessibility by People (e.g. parents, a teacher) was
the most prominent one: “other people can really check the Internet and they will
find everything about you” (focus group quotation (FGQ). It was followed by a
Table 1 Results of the focus group content analysis: inter-coder agreement
Coder 1 / Coder 2 Agreement between both coders Relative Importance
GENERAL ACCESSIBILITY
• By People 23 56,5%
• By Organizations 15
• Improper Access 5
SOCIAL THREATS FROM USER ENVIRONMENT
• Uncontrollable Actions 10 21,1%
• Bullying 4
• Stalking 2
ORGANIZATIONAL THREATS
• Collection by OSN Provider 2 21,1%
• Secondary Use by OSN Provider 4
• Collection by Third Parties 1
• Secondary Use by Third Parties 3
• Marketing (Banners and Emails) 6
IDENTITY THEFT
• Identity Theft 1 1,3%
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concern about information Accessibility to Organizations (an HR agency, an
insurance company):”If you apply for a job, human resources department checks”
or “all this information is available to CIA” (FGQ). Respondents also mentioned
concern over Improper Access, the notion that data might become available to
unauthorized parties: “it is easy to crack the account and they do that” (FGQ).
Concerns about Social Threats, defined as fears stemming from the OSN user
environment, were also mentioned frequently. These threats range from tagging a
user in unwanted photos and leaving inappropriate comments about the user on their
Wall or other public areas to user harassment or denigration on the platform. Within
this category, respondents were mostly concerned about actions they could not
control (Uncontrollable Actions): “…somebody makes a picture and then links it... then
people might see the picture I do not want [them] to [see]” (FGQ). Bullying, defined
by Hogben (2007, p. 4) as “purposeful acts of harm” which can take the form of
harassment, offensive behaviour, secret sharing, public embarrassment and humilia-
tion, emerged as another important concern: “some people can really do revenge
online” (FGQ). By placing humiliating messages in the public areas of user’s profile,
bullies can denigrate a user in the eyes of relevant others and, hence, intrude into one’s
private sphere. Stalking, defined as threatening behaviour in which a perpetrator
repeatedly contacts a victim, emerged as a concern of little importance: “what if
somebody is being not psychologically normal finds me somehow in the social
network and gets obsessed” (FGQ) and was excluded from the subsequent analysis.
Furthermore, participants were concerned about the Collection and Secondary
Use of their information by Organizations; discussing this concern, participants
differentiated between the OSN Provider, Third Parties, and a generic category we
call Marketing. Urged on by extensive media coverage and often guided by distorted
rumours, focus group participants feared the collection and misuse of their
information by OSN providers: “you remove everything from there, but the provider
keeps the history, it’s violation of your privacy”, “they make just billions of dollars,
these companies, how do they make this money? … They do something with the
content we provide on the site…”, “… they will now start to make money from the
network and sell the information of the users to third parties, to marketing firms or
whatever” (FGQ). Collection and Use of the information by the Third Parties was
also viewed as a source of concern: “But the third parties, for example in marketing,
[…] are selling the databases of contact information of other people”, “companies
who are just selling private data to other companies so they are able to send you like
personal advertising stuff” (FGQ). The generic Marketing category encompassed
concerns regarding the use of personal information to personalize banners or emails
on the network: “I always think that if I put all my hobbies and everything then all
these marketing firms will be running after me” (FGQ) or “There is definitely a
potential of using my information and then bombarding me with emails” (FGQ).
Concern regarding Identity Theft was mentioned only once. Nevertheless, this
threat can have very serious consequences if it actually takes place. We therefore
include it into our subsequent analysis.
Analysis of the focus groups helped us to get an in-depth understanding of user
privacy concerns. In addition, we gained important insights about the dynamics of
user self-communication on these platforms. On the one hand, despite perceived
privacy risks, users are willing to provide information about themselves on a social
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network to gain various benefits of communication. On the other hand, focus group
participants argued that they restrict how much information they reveal about
themselves, viewing it as an important strategy to address their privacy concerns.
Information disclosed on OSNs is often subject to cognitive control prior to its
publication. Theoretical findings show that OSN users try to control their audience
in order to mitigate their privacy concerns (Tufekci 2008). However, whereas users
may find it difficult to correctly assess the breadth and the kind of their audience
and, hence, feel unsure regarding the visibility of their information, they may choose
to control the information they are about to publish. Confirming this rationale, our
focus groups have shown that even when users reveal information on an OSN, they
claim to consciously control what exactly they disclose, accounting for the privacy
threats they perceive—a phenomenon we refer to as “Conscious Control” in the next
sections of our study. Thus, what participants reveal is often a result of what they feel is
harmless to them: “I don’t want to reveal information harmful to me in the future”
(FGQ). This phenomenon, expressed in the self-imposed restriction on the information
revealed, has already been observed in the context of blogs, where bloggers tend to place
constraints on the information they published accounting for possible future repercus-
sions for them or others (Gumbrecht 2004). Furthermore, our focus groups have shown
that, when participants decided to reveal their information, its content was abundant in
impression management. Naturally, participants tended to present mostly positive
information about themselves: “I reveal information which […] is praiseworthy” (FGQ).
Publishing dishonest or inaccurate information might be another strategy
individuals use to address privacy risks. However, it is of low importance in
accordance with the focus group results.
From our qualitative analysis of the focus groups, we can already conclude that OSN
participants are aware of and concerned about multiple privacy risks they face on an
OSN platform. As a result, they try to mitigate these risks by relying on various self-
disclosure strategies. In the next sections, we will empirically investigate the validity of
the focus group results and their implications for individual self-disclosure.
STAGE 2: Validating “User Privacy Concerns on OSNs” construct
Development of measurement scales
The categories identified through the focus groups served as a basis for the
questionnaire items. Pre-tested scales were used where possible. Nevertheless, due to
the explorative nature of the study, most items were self-developed. Table 8 in
Appendix 1 summarizes the scales used for the study.
As one can see, many items used to operationalize the PCOSN construct start
with an “I am often concerned…” formulation. Including the word “often” helped us
achieve much more realistic answers by avoiding a “talk is cheap” problem. This
problem is inherent in privacy surveys, as it does not cost a respondent anything to
express a desire for enhanced privacy protection (Harper and Singleton 2001).
Self-disclosure dynamics were captured on the basis of two dimensions of the
Self-Disclosure Scale (Wheeless and Grotz 1976): Amount and Honesty. We also
measured the “Conscious Control” construct—a dimension of self-disclosure which
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emerged as important during the focus group discussions. Even when disclosing a lot in
terms of “Amount”, focus group participants claimed to consciously control what
exactly was disclosed. The meaning of the “Conscious Control” construct lies between
the reversed “Control of Depth” and “Intent” dimensions of the Self-Disclosure Scale
developed by Wheeless and Grotz (1976). However, whereas “Control of Depth”
largely reflects the perceived intimacy of the information revealed and “Intent” stands
for the individual willingness to engage in the “self-revealing disclosure” (Wheeless
and Grotz 1976, p. 339), our “Conscious Control” construct underscores consciousness
of the self-restriction or information control act. We have chosen these dimensions as
the most interesting in terms of the implied self-presentation and identity performance
dynamics. All items reflecting self-disclosure had to be significantly changed or
developed anew to address the specifics of OSN communication.
All constructs were modelled as reflective with questions anchored on a 7-point
Likert scale (1: Strongly Disagree; 4: Neutral; 7: Strongly Agree).
Sampling
As the next step, an online questionnaire was launched in late Winter—Spring 2008.
The respondents were recruited via university mailing lists and advertisements
placed in various OSN groups. The targeted audience included users of two OSNs
particularly popular in Germany: Facebook and StudiVZ. Survey participants had a
chance to win numerous gift certificates as a reward for their participation. We
obtained 210 usable observations in total. 49% of the respondents in our sample
were male. 87.1% were students. 70.5% and 29.5% of the respondents indicated
StudiVZ and Facebook as their main OSN platform, respectively.
Exploratory factor analysis
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) is a widespread technique used to study
interrelationships among variables in a sample. It is especially helpful when the
number of variables is large, as it helps decrease complexity by mapping variables
onto a reduced number of extracted factors (Churchill and Iacobucci 2002). The aim
of the EFA in our study was to single out dimensions of the PCOSN construct.
Hence, all 32 variables (see Tables 2 and 8) that measured various aspects of privacy
concern were included in the analysis performed in SPSS 16.0.
At first, the applicability of our data for the EFAwas checked by looking at several
indicators. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy was 0.908.
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was also significant at a 0.000 level. Examination of the
anti-image correlation matrix did not force us to remove any items from the analysis.
Taken as a whole, these criteria suggest that our data for the EFA was adequate.
We used a principal components analysis to examine if the category structure
identified in the focus groups also existed in the extracted factor groups of the
collected data. Direct Oblimin rotation was chosen as inter-correlation between
extracted dimensions was expected1. In the initial solution, 7 factors (components)
with Eigenvalues higher than 1 were extracted, with the first 2 factors accounting for
1 Varimax rotation has rendered equivalent results.
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Table 2 Summary of the extracted dimensions using explorative factor analysis (pattern matrix)
Item Number Focus Group Category Mean SD Components
Concerns about
Organizational Threats
Concerns about
Social Threats
Acc1** General Accessibility 3.57 1.808 0.039 0.669
Acc_N2 (R)* 4.53 1.846 0.189 0.256
Acc3** 3.87 1.641 0.183 0.585
Acc4** 3.49 1.652 0.018 0.648
Acc5* 4.16 1.945 0.055 0.322
Acc_N6 (R)* 4.01 1.512 −0.025 0.360
SSC1 Uncontrollable Social Risks 3.39 1.598 −0.100 0.840
SSC2** 3.67 1.791 0.051 0.599
SSC3** 3.45 1.559 −0.124 0.739
SSB1 Bullying Social Risks 3.11 1.549 −0.086 0.797
SSB2 3.20 1.565 −0.049 0.827
SSB3 3.45 1.583 0.112 0.763
Col_N1 (R)** Collection by OSN Provider 4.71 1.670 0.698 −0.031
Col_2 4.25 1.696 0.572 0.271
Col_3 4.06 1.650 0.592 0.321
SU_1 Secondary Use by OSN
Provider
4.46 1.663 0.550 0.271
SU_N2 (R)** 4.21 1.651 0.575 −0.090
SU_N3 (R)** 5.47 1.569 0.680 −0.096
ColO_1 Collection by Third Parties 4.34 1.640 0.646 0.281
ColO_2 4.36 1.692 0.709 0.237
ColO_N3 (R)** 4.84 1.695 0.770 −0.005
SUO_1 Secondary Use by Third
Parties
4.41 1.600 0.625 0.251
SUO_2 4.23 1.549 0.648 0.261
SUO_N3(R)** 4.87 1.713 0.765 −0.047
SUm_N1 (R)* Marketing (Banners and
Emails)
3.24 1.708 0.396 0.084
SUmb_N2 (R)** 4.60 1.584 0.641 −0.259
SUmb_3** 4.52 1.905 0.697 −0.152
SUme_4** 3.98 1.667 0.485 0.252
SUme_N5 (R)** 4.47 1.753 0.527 0.092
IdT_N1 (R)* Identity Theft 3.82 1.626 0.265 0.267
IdT_N2 (R)* 3.51 1.628 0.214 0.234
IdT3* 3.76 1.478 0.202 0.373
(R) These items were reversed; * These items were removed after the EFA.** These items were removed
after the CFA model fitting procedure (items with labels in bold were used in the final Structural Equation
Model in Stage 3);
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43.7% in the cumulative variance. Each subsequent factor explained less than 5.3%
of the variance and was difficult to interpret. Taking into account that a substantial
proportion of variance was captured by the first two factors, we limited the number
of factors to be extracted to only 2, which was also suggested by the Scree Plot in
the next step. The inter-factor correlation constituted 0.4202. Table 2 summarizes the
identified dimensions and respective factor loadings. Factor loadings, indicating the
effect of a respective factor on a given indicator when at the same time controlling
for the other factors (Pedhazur and Schmelkin 1991), were considered meaningful
when they exceeded the threshold of 0.4 (Hair et al. 1998).
The interpretation of the extracted factors—suggested dimensions of the PCOSN
construct—is rather intuitive. It hints that individuals differentiate between two main
sources of privacy concern: organizations and OSN users.
The first factor, which we called Concerns about Organizational Threats,
combines all concerns users have that related to the organizational use of their
information. Our study shows that, in the organizational context, users neither
subjectively differentiate between who collects and uses the information they
provide (OSN Provider vs. Third Parties) nor do they make a distinction between the
collection and the secondary use of their information. In fact, secondary use is
impossible without information collection, and therefore users might assume that a
party collecting their information would also use it at some point.
The second factor, called Concerns about Social Threats, is mainly related to the
risks stemming from the OSN user environment. We find that individuals don’t
make distinctions based on the nature of the threat (purposeful bullying vs.
involuntary uncontrollable actions of others), instead concentrating on the threat
source (social environment).
It is important to note that, despite the importance of the Accessibility Threats for
the focus group participants, the items measuring this dimension did not form a
separate factor. This might be because the accessibility of the information is the
necessary pre-condition for all other threats. Therefore, when expressing their
concern over accessibility, participants were in fact implying secondary-level threats
(organizational, social, etc.). Additionally, Identity Theft neither emerged as a
separate factor nor loaded highly on any of the identified dimensions.
In summary, the two main dimensions of the PCOSN construct have been
identified as a result of the EFA: Concerns about Organizational Threats and
Concerns about Social Threats. We will confirm the existence of this factor structure
using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) in the next step.
Confirmatory factor analysis
At the next step, we assessed the reliability and validity of our PCOSN construct
through a CFA with maximum likelihood estimation using AMOS 16.0.1. As
derived in the EFA, we modelled the PCOSN construct as consisting of two separate
first-order factors: Concerns about Organizational Threats and Concerns about
Social Threats. In this analysis, all items from the EFAwith loadings higher than 0.4
2 Extraction of two factors using principal axis factoring method, as an alternative to principal components
analysis, has rendered equivalent results.
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were included and restricted to load on the respective factors they were supposed to
measure (Organizational and Social Threats). The factors themselves were allowed
to correlate with each other.
In the process of model adjustment, several items were removed from the model
(as summarized in Tables 2, 3 and 8). Accounting for the large number of newly
developed scales, this practice is acceptable as long as Content Validity is ensured
(Segars and Grover 1993). The resulting model is shown in Fig. 2. The model fulfilled
all reliability and validity requirements (partly shown in Table 4) and had an excellent
Table 3 Final operationalization of “user privacy concerns on OSNs” construct
Dimension 1: Concerns about Organizational Threats
Col_2 I am often concerned that OSN provider could store my information for the next couple of years
Col_3 Every now and then I feel anxious that OSN provider might know too much about me
SU_1 I am often concerned that OSN provider could share the information I provide with other parties
(e.g. marketing, HR or government agencies)
ColO_1 I am often concerned other parties (e.g. marketing, HR, government agencies) could actually
collect my publicly available information on OSN
ColO_2 I am often concerned that my current publicly available information could be stored at some
other party (e.g. marketing, HR, government agencies) many years from now
SUO_1 I am often concerned that other parties (e.g. marketing, HR, government agencies) could share
the information they have collected about me on OSN
SUO_2 It often worries me that other parties (e.g. marketing, HR, government agencies) could use the
information they have collected about me from OSN for commercial purposes
Dimension 2: Concerns about Social Threats
SSB1 I am often concerned that someone might purposefully embarrass me on OSN
SSB2 It often worries me that other users might purposefully write something undesired about me on
OSN
SSB3 I am often concerned that other users might take advantage of the information they learned about
me through OSN
SSC1 I am often concerned that I don’t have control over the actions of other users
Fig. 2 “User privacy concerns on OSNs” construct—CFA results
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fit (χ²/df=1.985; GFI=0.937; AGFI=0.896; RMSEA=0.069; CFI=0.976)3. Taken
together, these results provide evidence that the PCOSN construct is measured well.
In summary, the two main dimensions of the PCOSN construct were identified
and validated as a result of EFA and CFA: Concerns about Organizational and
Concerns about Social Threats. Typically, scales derived on the basis of one sample
should not be directly reused with the same sample. However, taking into account
the explorative nature of our study, we applied these scales within the collected data
to better understand self-presentation dynamics on OSN platforms. In the next
sections, we will empirically investigate the impact of the identified concerns on
various self-disclosure strategies in a Structural Equation Model (SEM).
STAGE 3: Identity construction and privacy concerns
Our focus groups have shown that privacy concerns are changing the way individuals
disclose information about themselves. In this light, exploring the impact of the
identified privacy concerns regarding Organizational and Social Threats on individual
self-disclosure is an important step towards understanding of the underlying self-
communication dynamics on OSN platforms. Wheeless and Grotz (1976) single out as
amount, honesty, intent of self-disclosure, control of depth, and its positive-negative
nature as dimensions of the individual self-disclosure. In the context of OSNs, (i)
amount reduction and (ii) falsification vs. honesty of the disclosed information, as well
as (iii) conscious control of the information to be released may encompass the most
salient aspects of the information disclosure strategies with respect to privacy risks.
We therefore concentrated exclusively on these three strategies.
Table 4 Quality criteria of the construct “user privacy concerns on OSNs”
Latent Variable Item Mean Standard
Deviation
Standardized
Factor Loading
AVE Composite
Reliability
Cronbach’s
Alpha
Concerns about
Organizational
Threats
Col_2 4.25 1.696 0.643 0.63 0.92 0.926
Col_3 4.06 1.650 0.687
SU_1 4.46 1.663 0.648
ColO_1 4.34 1.640 0.864
ColO_2 4.36 1.692 0.907
SUO_1 4.41 1.600 0.859
SUO_2 4.23 1.549 0.874
Concerns about
Social Threats
SSB1 3.11 1.549 0.838 0.64 0.88 0.879
SSB2 3.20 1.565 0.869
SSB3 3.45 1.583 0.755
SSC1 3.39 1.598 0.742
3 Discussion on the required thresholds to ensure validity and reliability of the measured construct can be
found in the “Measurement Model Evaluation – Confirmatory Factor Analysis” part of this paper. The
required cut-off criteria for model fit can be found in Table 7 below.
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Focus group participants emphasized reducing the amount of information
disclosed as an important strategy for dealing with rising privacy concerns. From
the organizational perspective, any information disclosed—independent of its
sensitivity—gives marketers additional insights into an individual’s personality,
and hence into the tastes and preferences of a potential customer. Similarly, for an
HR-manager, every additional piece of information reveals more about the potential
candidate and may therefore serve as the basis for an employment decision. For
example, Kluemper and Rosen (2008) have shown that Facebook profiles contain
enough information to judge on one’s job performance. Furthermore, the information
that individuals reveal can be used to implement more refined phishing attacks
(Hogben 2007). We therefore hypothesize that:
& H1: User Concerns regarding privacy-related Organizational Threats are
negatively related to the Amount of the Information disclosed on the platform.
In addition, the amount of information revealed can also be negatively affected by
the degree of social risks perceived. Detailed and updated profiles can be more
attractive for bullies, who might eventually use this information to harass a victim.
Similarly, one’s own friends and acquaintances can spread information they obtain
through an OSN and interpret it in the wrong context. The media presents abundant
examples of such incidents taking place (Hogben 2007).
Goffman (1959) asserts that, in the process of impression management, an
individual speaks to an anticipated audience. Implicitly accounting for the potential
risks of speaking to this expected “audience”, individuals may repress the disclosure
of personal information (Schau and Gilly 2003). We therefore hypothesize that:
& H2: User Concerns regarding Social Threats are negatively related to the Amount
of the Information disclosed on the platform.
In order to protect themselves from daunting risks, users may be tempted to partially
falsify some of the information they provide. For example, by giving the wrong name
or contact information, users can avoid direct recognition and identification and thereby
protect themselves from the prying eyes of organizations. Accounting for social risks,
participants might engage in over-enhancement or misrepresentation to make them look
better in the eyes of the others and thereby diminish the risk of being laughed at or
humiliated. Schau and Gilly (2003, p.387) argue that self-presentation strategies often
go hand in hand with modification or fabrication of the information a person reveals
about him-or herself, so that the image one projects is more in line with a person’s view
on oneself: “a desired self”. We therefore hypothesize that:
& H3: User Concerns regarding privacy-related Organizational Threats are
negatively related to the Honesty of the Information disclosed on the platform.
& H4: User Concerns regarding Social Threats are negatively related to the
Honesty of the Information disclosed on the platform.
Conscious Control, a measure reflecting the extent of conscious adjustment of the
information being disclosed, reflects the dynamics observed in the focus group
discussions, where participants claimed to carefully self-select information they were
about to publish. This conscious filtering of disclosed information appears to be an
important mechanism of identity control and is an integral part of the identity
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protection process. Thus, what participants reveal is often a result of what they feel
is harmless to them with respect to both organizational and social threats. In fact,
concerns regarding these threats can motivate user to carefully consider the
information she is about to publish. We therefore hypothesize that:
& H5: User Concerns regarding privacy-related Organizational Threats are positive-
ly related to the Conscious Control behind information disclosure on the platform.
& H6: User Concerns regarding Social Threats are positively related to the
Conscious Control behind information disclosure on the platform.
The summary of the model hypotheses is presented in Fig. 3.
Research methodology
The model depicted in Fig. 3 is a SEM. In line with methodological guidelines
(Anderson and Gerbing 1988), we evaluate theMeasurementModel (MM) first and the
Structural Model (SM) second. The assessment of the MM focuses on the relationship
between latent constructs and their respective indicators (Byrne 2001). SM evaluation
involves finding links between dependent (endogenous variables: dimensions of self-
disclosure) and independent (exogenous variables: privacy concerns) variables.
Measurement model evaluation — confirmatory factor analysis
CFA using maximum likelihood estimation was employed to evaluate the
reliability and validity of our MM using AMOS 16.0.1. Initial model evaluation
led us to eliminate several items measuring self-disclosure dimensions (see
Fig. 3 Research model: impact of privacy concerns on self-disclosure
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Tables 5 and 8). The remaining indicators have been used to evaluate the final
adjusted model.
In the first step, we assessed the Internal Consistency, Convergent validity, and
Discriminant validity of the measured constructs as shown in Tables 5 and 6.
Convergent validity reflects the extent to which several attempts to measure the
same construct are in consent (Bagozzi and Philips 1982). Convergent Validity was
verified by evaluating:
& Indicator Reliability, which is ensured when indicator loadings are significant
and exceed the cut-off level of 0.7 (Bagozzi and Yi 1988). In our study, all
Table 5 Quality criteria of the constructs
Latent Variable Item Mean Standard
Deviation
Standardized
Factor Loading
AVE Composite
Reliability
Cronbach’s
Alpha
Concerns about
Organizational
Threats
Col_2 4.25 1.696 0.645 0.63 0.92 0.926
Col_3 4.06 1.650 0.689
SU_1 4.46 1.663 0.648
ColO_1 4.34 1.640 0.864
ColO_2 4.36 1.692 0.907
SUO_1 4.41 1.600 0.859
SUO_2 4.23 1.549 0.873
Concerns about
Social Threats
SSB1 3.11 1.549 0.838 0.64 0.79 0.879
SSB2 3.20 1.565 0.869
SSB3 3.45 1.583 0.753
SSC1 3.39 1.598 0.744
Amount SD_A_1 3.47 1.714 0.589 0.49 0.79 0.787
SD_A_2 3.40 1.678 0.720
SD_A_3 3.23 1.752 0.827
SD_A_4 3.13 1.569 0.647
Honesty SD_H_2 5.07 1.685 0.912 0.72 0.84 0.830
SD_H_3 5.00 1.700 0.779
Conscious Control SD_C_1 5.20 1.571 0.873 0.63 0.83 0.830
SD_C_2 5.25 1.600 0.730
SD_C_3 5.48 1.458 0.765
Table 6 Square root of AVE (diagonal elements) and inter-construct correlation (off-diagonal elements)
OT ST Am Ho CC
Organizational Threats (OT) 0.791
Social Threats (ST) 0.557 0.803
Amount (Am) −0.163 −0.026 0.701
Honesty (Ho) −0.108 −0.002 0.172 0.848
Conscious Control (CC) 0.189 0.244 −0.092 0.350 0.792
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indicators were significant, with five out of twenty slightly lower than the
required cut-off level;
& Composite Reliability—values for all constructs in our study exceeded the
threshold of 0.6 (Bagozzi and Yi 1988);
& Average Variance Extracted (AVE)—values for all measured constructs
surpassed or closely approached the required threshold level of 0.5 (Fornell
and Larcker 1981).
Our results suggest that we can assume Convergent Validity. Internal Consistency,
a measure reflecting reliability of different items used to measure the same construct,
was also ensured: Cronbach’s Alpha for all constructs was higher than the required
value of 0.7 (Nunnally 1978).
In the next step, we assessed Discriminant Validity, a measure indicating
sufficient divergence between operationalizations of different constructs. Discrimi-
nant validity is fulfilled when the square root of AVE of any latent variable exceeds
Table 7 Goodness-of-fit measures for measurement and structural models
Fit Measures Recommended Value (Source) CFA SM
χ²/df < 2.00 (Carmines and McIver 1981) 1.445 1.588
GFI > 0.90 (Jöreskog and Sörborm 1989) 0.91 0.90
AGFI > 0.80 (Jöreskog and Sörborm 1989) 0.88 0.87
RMSEA < 0.08 (Jöreskog and Sörborm 1993) 0.046 0.053
CFI > 0.95 (Hu and Bentler 1999) 0.97 0.96
IFI > 0.95 (Hu and Bentler 1999) 0.97 0.96
TLI > 0.95 (Hu and Bentler 1999) 0.96 0.95
Fig. 4 Results of structural model
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the correlation between this and any other latent variables (Fornell and Larcker
1981). As seen in Table 6, this requirement is met for all constructs in our model.
Next, we assessed the quality of our MM by looking at the overall measures of
goodness of fit. For a good model fit, it is suggested that χ²/df should not exceed 2
(Carmines and McIver 1981). As Table 7 (column “CFA”) shows, our model meets this
requirement. All other required criteria for GFI, AGFI, RMSEA, CFI, IFI, TLI fit indices
were also met by the MM. Overall, these results suggest that our MM is well specified.
Structural model evaluation
We next assessed the SM. As shown in Table 7 (column “SM”), our SM has a good
overall fit. All recommended cut-off criteria are met. An important part of the evaluation
of the SM is assessment of the path coefficients and their significance (see Fig. 4). As a
result of model evaluation, hypotheses H1 and H6 were supported; hypotheses H2, H3,
H4 and H5 were rejected. Furthermore, 3.3%, 1.7% and 6.4% of the variance (R2) in the
endogenous variables Amount, Honesty, and Conscious Control respectively were
explained by our model. The implications of the model results are discussed below.
Discussion and managerial implications
Using the developed taxonomy of privacy concerns of users in OSNs as a basis for
the SEM, we find that Concerns about Organizational and Social Threats impact
different information disclosure strategies in distinct ways.
We find that concerns regarding Organizational Threats have a negative influence
on the amount of information individuals disclose: users tend to reduce self-
presentation on the platform when they fear that their information will be collected,
stored, and used by the OSN provider and various Third Parties. Hogben (2007)
warns of the risks of digital dossier aggregation and the subsequent use of this
information for marketing, HR, insurance, state security, and other purposes.
Advanced customer data analysis and granular personalization become possible
due to existence of information-intensive OSN profiles pool. The low cost of
information storage makes it possible to store user data for an indefinite amount time
and process it on demand. In response to their concerns over these practices, users
decrease the amount of the information they provide.
Interestingly, concerns over Social Threats do not have a significant impact on the
amount of information individuals disclose. This is in line with Tufekci (2008), who
finds little to no relationship between concerns regarding profile accessibility to the
unwanted audience and the amount of information disclosed on the network, explaining
this result by user reliance on privacy settings and the usage of nicknames. In fact,
privacy settings can be more powerful when dealing with social rather than
organizational threats. In fact, whereas users may rely on available functionality to
limit access to their information and control actions of other OSN members, these
control measures are largely ineffective when dealing with privacy concerns originating
from the actions of an OSN provider. Overall, the use of privacy controls may moderate
a relationship between concerns regarding social threats and behaviour—a relevant
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hypothesis which is, however, beyond the scope of our study and should be addressed
in the future research endeavours.
We find a significant link between concerns about Social Threats and the
Conscious Control dimension, which demonstrates that individuals consciously
weigh and select the information they disclose, adapting it with regard to the
expectations concerning their “imagined audience” (Boyd 2007). Indeed, users have
certain positive and negative expectations with regard to their social environment,
and hence adjust their self-communication with respect to it. Importance of
conscious control in managing concerns regarding social threats underscores
importance of impression management in the individual self-communication. Thus,
users carefully self-select information they present about themselves in their attempt
to avoid public embarrassment or secret revelation.
In our study, we find no link between the Honesty of individuals when they
disclose information and privacy concerns. This outcome suggests that, when in
doubt, participants choose not to disclose certain information rather than falsifying
the relevant details. An analysis of the means shows that, on average, participants
slightly agreed with the statements about always being honest and trustful with the
information they provided on OSNs (see Table 5). The truthfulness of revealed
information is partly related to the presence of real-life friends on the network, who
implicit verify one’s statements (Donath and Boyd 2004). Moreover, falsified
information connected to the user can also be a source of risk.
As a whole, our findings suggest that individuals engage in selective privacy-
conscious self-communication on OSN platforms. We show that user privacy
concerns do impact identity performance in a negative way, undermining the self-
sustainability of these platforms in the long-run. Our results call for OSN providers
and policy-makers to take immediate measures to address these concerns.
Concerns regarding Organizational Threats, which include the collection and
secondary use of member information, can be pro-actively addressed by developing
fair privacy policies, which may, in turn, help to develop more trust in OSN
providers. Culnan and Armstrong (1999) find that if fair information practices are
observed, customers will more willingly continue the relationship with the firm that
collects information about them. These insights are tightly connected with the notion
of the procedural fairness which reflects the extent a provider empowers user with
procedures to control their privacy as well as informs users about these procedures
(Son and Kim 2007). Furthermore, giving users more control over their information
through various privacy settings may help them to protect themselves against data
collection by third parties. Hence, transparency and usability of available controls
should be the top priority as well. From the technical side, access controls should be
enhanced to prevent unauthorized access to member profiles or systematic
information crawling by third parties.
Concerns regarding Social Threats can be alleviated by offering users clear
mechanisms to deal with the improper behaviour of others; user options might
include explicitly confirming photo tags before associated photos are published,
enhanced settings to facilitate the management of different friends groups or clear
conflict escalation procedures. These measures will help to protect users by giving
them greater control over their identity and context.
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In line with principles of procedural fairness, it is important to teach users how to
protect their information. Users should be explicitly advised not to reveal sensitive
information, e.g. their contact, location, and financial details, on the network. Once
they have been informed about potential risks and protection methods, users will be
able to consciously decide how much information to disclose in an atmosphere of
trust and transparency. This, in turn, would lead users to view the OSN as a safe
environment for self-presentation and identity construction.
Taking into account the popularity of OSN platforms, policy-makers should
contribute by developing and publicizing clear guidelines for how to deal with user
information, who owns it, and how users should proceed in the case of information
misuse.
All of these measures would help ensure more responsible self-disclosure on the
platform without endangering its self-sustainability. Furthermore, they would
encourage users to create social capital without having to sacrifice their privacy.
Concluding remarks
Until now, little was understood about the privacy concerns of OSN users and the
impact of those concerns on self-presentation strategies.
Recognizing that this research gap maybe caused by the lack of measurement
instruments adequately capturing the unique OSN context, we initially concentrated
our efforts on developing and validating measures for the “User Privacy Concerns
on OSNs” construct. On the basis of qualitative focus group results, we developed a
tentative framework capturing various aspects of privacy-related concerns of users
on OSNs. Our framework was then empirically validated on the basis of survey
responses from 210 subjects. We found that concerns about Organizational and
Social Threats constitute two underlying dimensions of the PCOSN construct.
At the next step, we examined the impact of the identified concerns on three
self-disclosure dimensions: amount, honesty, and conscious control. We found that
users tend to reduce how much information they disclose as a response to
perceived Organizational Threats. Additionally, users tend to consciously screen
the information they publish in light of concerns stemming from the OSN user
environment. On the basis of our findings, we provide insights for the OSN
provider and policy-makers, who can then develop specific mechanisms to
alleviate identified user concerns and thereby ensure network sustainability as
well as public value.
Both focus group participants as well as survey respondents in our study were
mainly students. Even though students represent an important part of OSN users
(Facebook 2009), other population groups are gaining in importance as well
(Insidefacebook 2009). Hence, validation of the PCOSN construct dimensions with
other population group represents a promising venue for further research.
Furthermore, taking a closer look at the relationship between identified dimensions
of privacy concerns and actual, as opposed to self-reported, self-disclosure behaviour
may reveal additional dynamics in how privacy concerns impact the process of
identity construction—another relevant opportunity for future studies.
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Appendix 1
Table 8 Construct operationalization
GENERAL ACCESSIBILITY
Acc1 I am often concerned that someone I don’t expect (e.g. a stranger, my “ex”, my parents,
teacher, boss) could view my profile on OSN
Acc_N2 It is not important for me that someone I do not want (e.g. my boss, my teacher) could view
my profile on OSN (reversed)
Acc3 I am often concerned that I cannot limit access to some information I publish on OSN for
some people
Acc4 I feel uncomfortable that many people might follow changes in my profile
Acc5 If I was in a job application process I would make many changes to my profile
Acc_N6 I don’t care what opinion others build about me based on what I write on OSN (reversed)
SOCIAL THREATS
Uncontrollable Social Risks
SSC1* I am often concerned that I don’t have control over the actions of other users
SSC2 It bothers me when other users tag me in pictures
SSC3 It bothers me when other users post something about me on the Wall
Bullying
SSB1 I am often concerned that someone might purposefully embarrass me on OSN
SSB2 It often worries me that other users might purposefully write something undesired
about me on OSN
SSB3 I am often concerned that other users might take advantage of the information they
learned about me through OSN
ORGANIZATIONAL THREATS
Collection by OSN Provider
Col_N1 It never actually worries me that OSN provider could collect information about me over the
years (reversed)
Col_2 I am often concerned that OSN provider could store my information for the next
couple of years
Col_3 Every now and then I feel anxious that OSN provider might know too much about me
Secondary Use by OSN Provider
SU_1 I am often concerned that OSN provider could share the information I provide with
other parties (e.g. marketing, HR or government agencies)
SU_N2 It rarely worries me that OSN provider could use the information I provide for commercial
purposes (reversed)
SU_N3 Even if OSN provider would start to share some of my information, I do not see a real threat
to my privacy (reversed)
Collection by Third Parties
ColO_1 I am often concerned other parties (e.g. marketing, HR, government agencies) could
actually collect my publicly available information on OSN
ColO_2 I am often concerned that my current publicly available information could be stored at
some other party (e.g. marketing, HR, government agencies) many years from now
ColO_N3 Even if third parties would collect my public information on OSN, I do not see a real threat
to my privacy (reversed)
Secondary Use by Third Parties
SUO_1 I am often concerned that other parties (e.g. marketing, HR, government agencies)
could share the information they have collected about me on OSN
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